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Kanazawa (2009) proposes a ‘‘first law of intergroup conflict,’’ suggesting that polygyny and its impact on access to
reproductive women provides ‘‘the ultimate cause’’ for civil war. This controversial claim is supported by an
empirical analysis at odds with most existing studies of civil wars. We reconsider the influence of polygyny in a
more conventional statistical model. We fail to find evidence that ethnic groups with polygyny engage more
frequently in civil wars, although it is possible to find results indicating that civil wars may be more common in
states with legal polygamy. We detail how these findings seem at odds with Kanazawa’s theory and argue that
misogyny seems a more plausible source of insights into the context for civil war and peace. We then show that civil
wars are less common when women’s rights are better established and that legal polygamy has no discernable
residual effect once women’s rights are considered.
A First Law of Intergroup Conflict?1
Kanazawa argues that the risk of civil war is a func-
tion of ‘‘the relative availability of reproductive
women’’ (2009, 25). According to Kanazawa, repro-
duction is the key individual motivation; polygyny
‘‘reduces the availability of reproductive women in
groups’’ (27), and the reproductive motive and frus-
tration increase the risk of violent warfare. Based on
the ‘‘Savanna principle,’’ stipulating that ‘‘the human
brain has difficulty comprehending and dealing with
entities and situations that did not exist in the ances-
tral environment’’ (27), Kanazawa expects reproduc-
tive frustration to give rise to civil conflict involving
polygynous groups. However, there should not be
any effect on interstate war, since ‘‘men’s evolved
psychological mechanisms, adapted to and designed
for the ancestral environment, would not incline
them then to channel their heightened desire
through’’ bureaucratic structures, where ‘‘political
leaders who control these institutions already have
multiple mates’’ (29). Kanazawa claims that polygyny
‘‘explains’’ so much of the ‘‘variance in civil war
experience’’ that it should be regarded as ‘‘the first
law of . . . civil wars’’ (25).
Kanazawa’s reported results are generally incon-
sistent with previous research on civil war, and many
details in the empirical analysis are highly unclear. His
theory strikes us as odd and questionable. The postu-
lated contrast between civil and interstate wars—
where organized bureaucracies are held to play a
major role—seems to equate the former with unor-
ganized violence, which overlooks the role of the state
as an actor in civil wars and the importance of collec-
tive action in rebellion (see the definition employed
for Kanazawa’s data in Small and Singer 1982). Still,
the claims of a law-like link between polygyny and civil
war merits closer scrutiny.
We reexamine the evidence for a link between
polygyny and civil war in a more conventional model
of civil war and consider whether specific ethnic
groups practice polygyny and participate in conflict.
We find no evidence that polygynous groups are
more likely to be involved in civil war, although there
is some evidence that states that allow for polygamy
may be more conflict prone. We critique Kanazawa’s
The Journal of Politics, Vol. 73, No. 1, January 2011, Pp. 265–270 doi:10.1017/S0022381610001003
 Southern Political Science Association, 2011 ISSN 0022-3816
1An online appendix with supplementary material for this article is available at http://www.journals.cambridge.org/JOP. Data and
supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results is available at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/publ.html.
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proposed evolutionary explanation and argue that
misogyny, or variation in the relative status of
women, seems more important for the risk of civil
war than polygyny.
Untangling Kanazawa’s Analysis
The analysis in Kanazawa (2009, 31) suggests that only
polygyny and ‘‘national IQ’’ are statistically significant
predictors of civil war experience2. The model speci-
fication is highly unconventional, however, and the
results are in stark contrast to previous results on civil
war. For example, economic development, which has
been emphasized as consistently robust in other
studies (see, for example, Hegre and Sambanis 2006),
is held to be completely irrelevant to civil war.
Kanazawa’s (2009) analysis is poorly documented
and appears to suffer from a number of problems.3
Kanazawa indicates that he creates a measure of a
country’s ‘‘conflict experience’’ from a factor analysis
of the Small and Singer (1982) civil and interstate war
data for the period 1816–1980. The reported number
of cases for the analyses (N 5 133) suggests that the
observations must refer to a cross-section of coun-
tries, but there is no discussion of how conflict data
for 164 years are aggregated to a single cross section.
Moreover, there is no indication of what year(s) the
information on features such as democracy and eco-
nomic development may refer to. The cited democ-
racy data from Bollen (1990) are available only for a
few years after 1960, and it appears as if Kanazawa
tries to account for conflict over the period using
covariates measured towards the end, despite obvious
problems of temporal ordering. While Kanazawa
invokes the absence of conflict between democracies
as ‘‘the first law of interstate conflict’’ (2009, 31), his
analysis of interstate wars only considers individual
states and could not by construction reflect this
dyadic relationship.4
Kanazawa does not consider the specific groups
engaging in conflict or compare the rate at which
polygynous groups participate in conflict to others.
In the spirit of Kanazawa’s (2009, 33) explicit call for
more disaggregated analysis, we reexamine the link
between polygyny and conflict using the new Ethnic
Power Relations (EPR) data on ethnic groups and
their specific involvement in conflict (see Wimmer,
Cederman, and Min 2009). We use a theoretically
better motivated model of the risk of conflict by
ethnic groups as our point of departure, based on
Cederman, Wimmer, and, Min (2010). This also
allows us to compare any effects of polygyny on
conflict to other features highlighted in existing
research on civil war.
Polygyny and Ethnic Groups
Kanazawa claims to use an overall polygyny score for
countries, based on a four-level index of the extent of
polygyny within specific ethnic groups, multiplied by
their relative population shares. Without access to
Kanazawa’s actual polygyny data, we turn to his cited
source, namely the Encyclopedia of World Cultures
(EWC) (Levinson 1991–95). While the EWC provides
summaries of different cultures including marital
institutions, it does not actually provide information
on the frequency of polygyny in any standardized
form, or as a scale in the way suggested by Kanazawa.
The examples cited by Kanazawa (2009, 30) of the
Turks (held to be monogamous) and Kurds (held to
be polygynous) are highly ambiguous; The entry for
the Kurds simply states that ‘‘according to the Quran,
a man may have up to four wives . . . however, few
men can afford even two wives’’ (Levinson 1991–95,
176). The entry for Turks does not mention polygyny,
but many reports indicate examples of polygamy
among ethnic Turks despite polygamy being illegal
in Turkey.5 It does not seem possible to recreate
Kanazawa’s polygyny scores without additional infor-
mation on the specific criteria used and how the
material was interpreted. We opt for the simpler
alternative of a dummy variable for all EPR groups
listed under polygyny in the index of ECW.
The ECW seems primarily focused on minority
groups and provides less information on dominant
groups and cultures. As such, it may understate the
extent to which polygyny is permitted.6 We also
consider whether a state allows for polygamy under
common law, based on the WomanStats project
2Kanazawa’s results suggest a positive relationship between
national IQ and conflict, although he does not comment on
these results.
3Kanazawa refused to make his data available and did not
respond to questions that would have allowed us to replicate
his analysis.
4Researchers generally agree that there is little evidence that
individual democratic states engage less frequently in interstate
conflict (see Russett and Oneal 2001).
5E.g., http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/article489773.
ece.
6Any such biases, however, would also apply for kanazawa’s
(2009) analyses, as this is based on the same source.
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(Caprioli et al. 2009). This allows us to examine
differences in civil war risk for states that allow for
polygamy and groups that practice polygyny in other
legal contexts.
Polygyny, Misogyny, and Civil War
The EPR data provide a list of ethnic groups and their
size, as well as their political status in terms of access to
executive power, based on an expert survey. The civil
war coding is based on the PRIO/Uppsala Conflict
Data Program (see Gleditsch et al. 2002), and consid-
ers whether specific ethnic groups are involved in a
civil conflict with more than 25 battle deaths, either in
terms of the specific motive, or claims of insurgent
groups, or patterns of recruitment.
We follow the model specification in Cederman,
Wimmer, and Min (2010), who consider civil war
onset by year and a number of group and country
characteristics. Space constraints preclude us from
providing details on their model and data, and we
refer to the original paper and the online appendix
for further information. Model 1 in Table 1 shows the
results for a logistic regression of ethnic conflict onset
for all groups in the EPR data, adding the indicator
for whether the group practices polygyny to the core
model. The estimated coefficient for polygyny is not
significantly different from 0 and yields no evidence
that polygynous groups are more likely to engage in
conflict. The coefficient is also small, indicating a
trivial effect on the log-odds of conflict. By contrast,
groups that are excluded from state power or ‘‘down-
graded’’ (i.e., of experiencing a loss in access to state
power over the last two years) are notably more likely
to see conflict onset. Model 2 adds the legal polygamy
variable to the model. We find a positive coefficient
on the risk of civil war for states that allow for
polygamy, but we note that the size of the coefficient
remains much smaller than the coefficients for
excluded and downgraded groups. Moreover, any
effect only pertains to the legal practices of the state
rather than individual groups, and there is no
significant residual effect for groups practice poly-
gyny. As such, there is no basis for concluding that
polygynous groups have a higher risk of conflict than
monogamous groups, even when controlling for legal
polygamy in states.
We have considered a number of alternative
specifications, none of which suggest any evidence
that polygynous groups are more likely to engage in
civil wars (see appendix for details). There is no
evidence of an interaction between group polygyny
and legal polygamy, and in some specifications we
even find lower estimated risks of conflict for
polygynous groups. Varying the criteria for legal
polygamy (e.g., by including cases with recognition
under customary law) tends to yield yet smaller
estimated coefficients, in some cases not significantly
different from 0 by conventional significance criteria.
Many of the features included in the group level
analysis, such as GDP per capita and legal polygamy,
are state level features that do not vary across groups
within a country. To ensure that our results do not
stem from a disproportionate number of groups
originating in specific countries, we also consider a
country level analysis, based on the Fearon and Laitin
(2003) model and data for civil war at the country
level. This considers various political, economic, and
geographical state characteristics as predictors of civil
conflict. Given Kanazawa’s focus, we consider only
Fearon and Laitin’s ethnic conflicts category here.
Model 3 in Table 1 displays the estimated results and
suggests a similar positive and significant effect on
ethnic conflict for states with legal polygamy.
It is difficult to see how these results can be
regarded as consistent with Kanazawa’s claim of
discovering a ‘‘first law of civil war,’’ comparable to
the democratic peace in the case of interstate conflict.
The fact that we find no evidence of groups practicing
polygyny being more likely to be involved in civil war
seems inconsistent with Kanazawa’s claims based on
the ‘‘Savanna principle’’ and how constraints on
opportunities for reproduction under polygyny leads
to frustration and violence similar to ancestral vio-
lence, in stark contrast to organized warfare.7 Since
we at best can find a positive effect for states that
endorse polygamy, the effects of civil war seem to
follow from state rather than group characteristics.
When we distinguish conflicts by incompatibility, we
also find a large positive effect for legal polygamy on
conflicts over the government, fully comparable with
the effect on secessionist conflicts. This seems incon-
sistent with Kanazawa’s theory and claims about
alleged implications for organized violence, since
attacks on the state normally require greater
7Goldstein (2001, 246) reviews a number of studies suggesting
that polygyny is more common in societies with high mortality
due to warfare, but these studies see warfare as shaping marital
institutions rather than polygyny causing civil war. The fact that
polygyny in practice often tends to consist of marriage to widows
and wives of deceased siblings suggest that polygyny may be a
response to an excess ‘‘supply’’ of women. If so, polygyny is less
likely to have the dramatic consequences implied by Kanazawa in
terms of constraining the availability of reproductive women.
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capacity and organization than smaller peripheral
insurgencies.
The effects of states having legal polygamy are
also substantively small compared to other features
such as political exclusion in our group-level analysis
or the higher risk of conflict in new states at the
country level. As such, it is difficult to see why any
link between polygynous marital institutions and civil
war should be elevated to the status of a ‘‘law,’’ and
highlighted over other features affecting the risk of
civil war. The democratic peace may be regarded as
an empirical law in the sense that we do not have any
clear counterexamples of wars between two democ-
racies (see Ray 1993). It is obviously not the case
that civil war only occurs in the presence of polygyny
or that all states with legal polygamy experience
civil war.
We find the empirical evidence difficult to re-
concile with Kanazawa’s claim about civil war ema-
nating from reproductive frustration in polygynous
groups. However, we do not dispute that societies
with misogyny, or discrimination against women,
may be more likely to see civil war. A considerable
literature on this topic, largely ignored by Kanazawa,
argues that societies where men and women have
more equal status see less civil war and interstate
conflict, and in our view offers more plausible
theoretical foundations.8 Melander (2005), for exam-
ple, emphasizes the commonality between gender
roles that legitimize female subordination and dom-
inance in war (see also Caprioli 2000; Goldstein
2001). The emergence of more equal gender roles
strengthens norms of respect and individual inviol-
ability and extend social norms that reject abuse and
violence to a wider sphere. From this perspective,
gender equality should be associated with less collec-
tive violence, including both civil war and interstate
war. Another interpretation argues that greater gen-
der equality is associated with less conflict since
women tend to be less supportive of violence than
men. Although many studies have demonstrated
gender effects with respect to aversion to the use of
violence (see Regan and Paskeviciute 2003; Togeby
1994), survey data from four countries in the Middle
East actually show that these gender differences
TABLE 1 Estimates of the Risk of Ethnic Civil War, by Group and Country
Group Level Country Level
1 2 3 4
Excluded 1.157*** (0.258) 1.202*** (0.249) Ongoing War 20.871* (0.350) 21.339* (0.591)
Downgraded 1.663*** (0.369) 1.619*** (0.363) GDP p.c. 20.301** (0.106) 20.587* (0.240)
Group Size 0.283*** (0.076) 0.267*** (0.075) Population 0.380*** (0.105) 0.197 (0.125)
Warhistory 0.823*** (0.171) 0.778*** (0.161) % Mountainous
Terrain
0.148 (0.103) 0.130 (0.137)
GDP p.c. 20.394*** (0.106) 20.294** (0.103) Non-contiguous 0.588 (0.502) 1.954** (0.672)
Population 20.011 (0.093) 20.038 (0.090) Oil 0.681 (0.376) 20.259 (0.655)
Peaceyears 20.141* (0.071) 20.144* (0.071) New State 1.757*** (0.421) 3.615*** (0.944)
Spline 1 20.001 (0.001) 20.001 (0.001) Instability 0.415 (0.259) 0.223 (0.459)
Spline 2 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) Polity 0.007 (0.021) 0.036 (0.021)
Spline 3 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) Ethnic
Fractionalization
20.365 (0.766) 20.302 (1.071)
Group Polygyny 0.198 (0.498) 0.208 (0.493) Religious
Fractionalization
1.620 (0.493) 1.234 (1.143)
Legal Polygamy 0.608* (0.237) Legal Polygamy 0.849* (0.386) 0.501 (0.542)
CIRI 23.374* (1.376)
Constant 21.683 (1.167) 22.626* (1.237) Constant 28.906*** (1.073) 24.613** (1.501)
Observations 24393 24393 Observations 5186 2134
Log-Likelihood 2784.8 2780.9 Log-Likelihood 2300.2 2129.6
Robust standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses
***p#0.001, **p#0.01, *p#0.05
8Kanazawa (2009,32) acknowledges the results in Caprioli (2005)
on how societies with greater gender inequality are more prone to
civil war. However, he ignores her alternative theoretical per-
spective, and simply argues that these empirical findings support
his theory, since ‘‘[s]ocieties characterized by greater degrees of
gender inequality tend to have higher degrees of resource
inequality among men . . . and . . . are more likely to be
polygynous ‘‘ (Kanazawa 2009, 32).
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disappear when taking into account attitudes to
gender inequality (Tessler and Warriner 1997). This
perspective suggests that any effects from legal po-
lygamy to civil war should be be considered part of a
more general link between misogyny and violence.
We find it instructive that polygamy seems to become
less common with education and female emancipa-
tion and that we see increasing calls for bans on
polygamy from women’s groups in many countries.
An interesting recent example of opposition to
polygamy in Indonesia featured bodybuilders flexing
their muscles while linking polygamy to violence
against women, in a clear subversion of traditional
gender roles.9 While evolutionary perspectives em-
phasizing the reproductive motive presumably would
see these features as largely inescapable and enduring
traits, norms concerning misogyny, gender roles, and
violence may be better seen as socially constructed
features that can change quickly over time. This view
seems much more consistent with the observed
patterns of violence around the world and trends in
conflict over time than the alleged reproductive
constrains arising from polygyny.
We evaluate the relative importance of legal poly-
gamy and misogyny for conflict empirically using
data from Cingranelli and Richards (2005) on wom-
en’s political, social, and economic rights. The data
provide ordinal scales with four levels, for 1981 to
2004, ranging from a value of 0, where women have
no rights whatsoever, to a value of 3 when rights are
guaranteed, enforced, and with some notable effects.
We constructed a summary indicator (CIRI) based
on the sum of the indicators, rescaled to range from 0
to 1 (see appendix for further details). Model 4 in
Table 1 adds the indicator for women’s rights to
country level Model 3. Since the data are available
from 1981 only, the number of observations is
obviously reduced considerably relative to Model 3.
Adding the CIRI women’s right indicator results in
the coefficient for legal polygamy on ethnic civil war
onset switching sign, although the negative coefficient
is not statistical significant. (Constraining Model 3 to
the shorter time frame yields a positive, but not
significant coefficient for the legal polygamy variable,
see appendix.) By contrast, the CIRI women’s rights
indicator displays a negative and statistically signifi-
cant association with ethnic civil war. In terms of the
effects on the log-odds of civil war, we note that the
negative CIRI coefficient in Model 4 is over seven
times larger than the positive coefficient for legal
polygamy in Model 3. Despite the limited time frame,
our analyses of the available data thus seem clearly
consistent with our claim that legal polygamy at best
is a special case of more general misogyny, and there
is no support for Kanazawa’s interpretation that the
empirical results for gender equality on civil war
reflect more fundamental implications of polygyny.
Conclusion
Research on conflict has always been a highly
interdisciplinary field. We are in principle open to
the idea that evolutionary approaches may be helpful
for understanding political phenomena and conflict
(see, for example, Fowler and Schreiber 2008). How-
ever, efforts to provide contributions to existing
questions from new angles can often be strengthened
if they consider existing theoretical arguments and
research, and when researchers proceed in an open
and transparent manner. We conclude from our
reexamination that Kanazawa’s analysis fails to meet
these criteria and that there is little evidence for
Kanazawa’s alleged ‘‘first law of civil war.’’ In our
view, Kanazawa’s evolutionary explanation linking
polygyny and conflict through reproduction as the
ultimate human motivation is unlikely to be partic-
ularly helpful understanding civil war, and it seems
unfortunate to deemphasize the political motivation
for violence, and especially the role of political
exclusion and poor state governance in motivating
resort to rebellion. On a more constructive note,
however, we also think that the empirical results
suggest that a continued focus on misogyny and how
the relative status of women may be associated with
differences in ‘‘bad governance’’ and the propensity
of individuals to accept the use violence can provide
helpful insights into understanding the context of
civil war and peace.
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